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NOTES
THE BIG CHILL: APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 548(a)(2) OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE TO NONCOLLUSIVE
FORECLOSURE SALES
INTRODUCTION
The United States Bankruptcy Code' grants the trustee in bankruptcy2
the power to avoid certain transactions involving a debtor who has filed a
bankruptcy petition.3 The purpose of these avoiding powers is to prevent
an unequal distribution of the debtor's assets via transactions that are not
in the best interest of all the creditors.' One such power is contained in
section 548(a)(2),' a constructive fraud provision that allows the trustee
in bankruptcy to avoid a fraudulent transfer of a debtor's interest in
property occurring within one year prior to the filing of a petition of
bankruptcy.6 A transfer is deemed fraudulent under section 548(a)(2) if,
in exchange, the debtor receives less than a reasonably equivalent value
and is insolvent on the date of such transfer or is rendered insolvent as a
result of such transfer.7
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151,326 (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
(98 Stat.) 333 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
2. The bankruptcy trustee is either appointed by the court or elected by the debtor's
unsecured creditors and is charged with the duty of managing the bankrupt's estate. See
II U.S.C. §§ 701-702, 704 (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §§ 701-702, 704, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 380-81 (to be codified at II U.S.C. §§ 701-702, 704).
3. Note, Mortgage Foreclosure as Fraudulent Conveyance: Is Judicial Foreclosure an
Answer to the Durrett Problem?, 1984 Wis. L. Rev. 195, 215 [hereinafter cited as Answer
to the Durrett Problem]; see I 1 U.S.C. §§ 544-545, 547-549, 724(a) (1982), as amended by
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-353,
§§ 544-545, 547-549, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 377-79 (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 544-545, 547-549).
4. Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 215; see H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5963, 6138-39; 3
Collier on Bankruptcy 60.01 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)).
6. 1d; see, eg., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197,
1198-99 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); DeMusis v. Carr, 40 Bankr. 1007,
1008 (D. Conn. 1984); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 869 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr.
701, 702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)); see, e.g., First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398
(1984); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1198-99 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); DeMusis v. Carr, 40 Bankr. 1007, 1008 (D. Conn. 1984);
Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); New
Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 702 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1984).
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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Courts are divided on the applicability of section 548(a)(2) to noncol-
lusivel mortgage9 or deed of trust"0 foreclosure sales. " The controversy
centers on two issues: first, whether a transfer occurs during foreclosure
proceedings and second, how to measure reasonably equivalent value in
the context of a foreclosure sale. Although the majority of courts ad-
dressing these issues has found that a transfer for purposes of section
548(a)(2) occurs during foreclosure proceedings, 2 there has been no con-
8. Collusive foreclosure sales would arguably be avoidable under § 548(a)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code, which contemplates transfers made by a debtor with fraudulent intent.
See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)). This Note deals
with foreclosure sales involving debtors who do not possess an intent to defraud their
creditors.
9. A mortgage is an instrument used as a financing device. Through a mortgage, a
debtor-mortgagor transfers an interest in real property to a lender-mortgagee to secure
the repayment of a loan. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Estate Finance
Law § 1.1, at 1 (1979); Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 198-99. States
have adopted one of two theories of mortgage law. Under a lien theory, the mortgage
represents a lien on the real property whereby the mortgagor retains possession, legal title
and equitable title to the property. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra,
§ 1.5, at 10; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 198. Under a title theory, the
mortgagee has legal title to the property but the mortgagor is recognized as the owner.
See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra, § 1.5, at 10; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 199.
10. A deed of trust is a mortgage instrument permitted by some states instead of a
mortgage; it conveys the security interest to a trustee who has the power to sell the prop-
erty pursuant to a power of sale clause upon the debtor's default. See G. Osborne, G.
Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 1.6, at 11-12; Washburn, The Judicial and Legis-
lative Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 843,
847 (1980); Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 201-02.
11. Through a foreclosure sale, a secured lender (mortgagee) is enabled to recover the
debt owed to it by executing on its security interest in real property created by the mort-
gage instrument. See Washburn, supra note 10, at 844-47; Answer to the Durrett Problem,
supra note 3, at 199-201. The sale is triggered by the debtor's default in repayment of a
loan and may take several forms depending upon the type of mortgage instrument in-
volved and the law of the jurisdiction. See Washburn, supra note 10, at 847; Answer to the
Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 199-205. A foreclosure sale may be judicial or nonjudi-
cial. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 7.9, at 442; Washburn,
supra note 10, at 846; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 205. A judicial sale
is conducted by an officer of the court at a public auction. See Washburn, supra note 10,
at 847; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 205. A nonjudicial sale is con-
ducted by either a public official, the mortgagee or trustee under a deed of trust, see G.
Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 7.9, at 442-43; Washburn, supra note
10, at 846-47; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 201-02, and may be either a
private sale or public auction, see Washburn, supra note 10, at 847.
12. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Huhm, 738 F.2d 323, 326-27 (8th Cir.) (trans-
fer occurred at some time during the foreclosure process), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398
(1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (transfer occurred on the foreclosure sale date), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164
(1982); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (transfer
was final on the date of the foreclosure sale); Lakeview Inv. Group v. Pemberton, 40
Bankr. 449, 452 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (foreclosure sale constituted a transfer of an
interest in property of the debtor); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer &
Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (transfer occurred at the time of
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sensus on the measure of reasonably equivalent value.1 3
foreclosure); Carr v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 654, 656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (transfer
occurred on the sale date), afl'd on other grounds, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Ros-
ner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (nonjudicial foreclosure
sale is a transfer); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 820 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1983) (same); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 445-46 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (transfer occurred by means of a foreclosure
sale); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 23 Bankr. 36, 39
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (transfer occurred pursuant to a foreclosure sale); Cooper v.
Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (transfer occurred after a 10-day statu-
tory redemption period following a foreclosure sale); see also Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones,
20 Bankr. 988, 994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (no court interpreting § 548(a)(2) has "distin-
guished between a foreclosure sale and any other kind of transfer"). But see Madrid v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.) ("a foreclosure sale is not a
transfer by a debtor"), affig on other grounds 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); William v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Bankr. 989, 991 (D.
Minn. 1984) (§548(a)(2) was not intended to apply to noncollusive foreclosure sales);
Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (foreclosure
sale does not involve a transfer); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981) (transfer did not occur during state foreclosure proceedings), affd, 22 Bankr. 1017
(D. Alaska 1982).
13. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.) (reason-
ably equivalent value cannot be determined without an evidentiary hearing), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir.
1980) (57.7% of the fair market value on the foreclosure sale date is not reasonably
equivalent value); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984) (reasonably equivalent value should be conclusively presumed at regularly con-
ducted noncollusive foreclosure sales); In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 753 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1984) (reasonably equivalent value is not received when no value is received for the
debtor's equity); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40
Bankr. 701, 701, 706-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (reasonably equivalent value is received
when the purchase price plus the value of the remaining encumbrance exceeds the fair
market value of the property); United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 670 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1984) (reasonably equivalent value is received when the value given in exchange
for the transfer almost equals the full amount of the fair market value); Frank v. Berlin,
39 Bankr. 166, 177 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (reasonably equivalent value is not received
when the debtor received far less than equivalent value under any reasonable method of
calculation); Carr v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 656-57 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (reasonably
equivalent value is not received when the purchase price is 31% of the debtor's equity in
the property), afid, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr.
910, 915 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (reasonably equivalent value is not received when the
foreclosure sale was not regularly conducted and the price received was grossly inade-
quate so as to make it voidable under state law); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v.
Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (reasonably equivalent value is not
received in exchange for the transfer when the sale price is less than 70% of the fair
market value of the property on the sale date); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re
Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (reasonably equivalent value
depends on the facts of each case); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable
Trust Co., 23 Bankr. 36, 39 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (a purchase price of less than 57.7%
of the property's fair market value on the sale date is not reasonably equivalent value);
Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (reasonably
equivalent value is not received when the purchase price is less than 70% of the fair
market value of the debtor's equity on the sale date); Smith v. American Consumer Fin.
Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 351 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (reasonably equivalent value is not
received when the purchase price is a mere fraction of the fair market value on the sale
date); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (reasonably equivalent
value must be determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case);
1985]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
This Note examines these issues' 4 in terms of the literal interpretation
of section 548(a)(2), the legislative intent behind its enactment and the
policy underlying the Bankruptcy Code. Part I establishes that state
foreclosure proceedings involve two types of transfers within the scope of
section 548(a)(2). Part II examines section 548(d)(1) of the Code, which
mandates the time at which a transfer occurs for purposes of section
548(a)(2). It concludes that a transfer does occur in the course of fore-
closure proceedings. Part III discusses three possible approaches to
measuring reasonably equivalent value at foreclosure sales and advocates
a case-by-case analysis.
I. FORECLOSURE SALES AS TRANSFERS
A. Nature of the Transfer
Section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code 5 contains a broad definition of
the term "transfer" that applies throughout the Code. 6 It is well settled
that a foreclosure sale involves a transfer under section 101(41) of the
Code.' 7 This section has been amended by the 1984 amendments to the
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (rea-
sonably equivalent value equals that obtained at a regularly conducted public foreclosure
sale), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984);
Madrid, 21 Bankr. at 428 (Volirn J., dissenting) (majority affords the consideration re-
ceived at a noncollusive foreclosure sale a conclusive presumption of reasonableness);
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 994 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (reasonably
equivalent value is not received when the purchase price is one-third to one-half of the
fair market value on the sale date); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18
Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (as a general rule, reasonably equivalent value is
not received when the purchase price is less than 70% of the fair market value of the
property on the sale date).
14. This Note will not address the question whether a debtor's personal property used
as collateral to secure a debt and sold pursuant to the debtor's default in repayment of the
debt is subject to avoidance under § 548(a)(2). For a discussion of this issue, see Calairo
v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank (In re Ewing), 36 Bankr. 476 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Zinman, Houle
& Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross and Borowitz: A Tale of Two
Circuits, 39 Bus. Law. 977, 1015 (1984).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(48), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) 333, 364, 366, 368 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(48)).
16. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy % 548.01[2] (L. King 15th ed. 1979); Cook, Fraudu-
lent Transfer Liability Under The Bankruptcy Code, 17 Hous. L. Rev. 263, 266-67 (1980).
17. Alden, Gross & Borowitz, Real Property Foreclosure as a Fraudulent Conveyance:
Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus. Law. 1605, 1608 (1983); see First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398
(1984); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 548-49
(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Lakeview Inv. Group v.
Pemberton, 40 Bankr. 449, 452 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984); New Yorketown Assocs. v.
Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 702-06 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984);
Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Alsop v. Alaska, 14
Bankr. 982, 985-86 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), af'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982);
Note, Regularly Conducted Non-collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Sales: Inapplicability of
Section 548(a)(2) of The Bankruptcy Code, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 261, 264 (1983) [herein-
after cited as Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2)]. But see Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra
[Vol. 53
NONCOLLUSIVE FORECLOSURE SALES
Bankruptcy Code"8 and its substance is contained in section 101(48) of
the Code, which provides:
"transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or condi-
tional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with prop-
erty or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a
security interest and foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption[.]'9
For purposes of section 548(a)(2), courts have found either or both of
two different section 101 transfers to occur during foreclosure proceed-
ings:2" transfer of the debtor's possessory interes t or transfer of the
debtor's equity interest.'
note 14, at 995-98 (Congress defined transfer broadly in § 101(41) so as to achieve uni-
formity among the various Code sections dealing with transfers rather than to bring non-
collusive foreclosure sales within the scope of the fraudulent conveyance provision).
18. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-
353, 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 11 U.S.C.).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(48), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) 333, 364, 366, 368 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(48)) (1984 amend-
ment indicated in italics).
In an off-the-floor colloquy between Senators Dole and DeConcini after the 1984 bank-
ruptcy amendments were passed, Senator Dole stated that this amendment was not in-
tended to subject foreclosure sales to avoidance under § 548(a)(2). Senator Dole
reasoned that hearings on the issue were not held prior to the amendment's enactment
and whether a foreclosure sale constitutes a § 101 transfer was not an issue in contro-
versy. See 130 Cong. Rec. S13,771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
The occurrence of this colloquy after the amendment was passed appears to be in re-
sponse to lobbyists' efforts and does not express the intent of Congress. See Alden, Gross
& Borowitz, The 'Durrett' Controversy and Foreclosure Sales, N.Y.LJ., Nov. 14, 1984, at
36, col. 2.
20. Whether one or both of these transfers occurs depends upon the type of foreclo-
sure proceedings adopted by a state. For a discussion of the various foreclosure proceed-
ings, see supra notes 9-11.
21. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547,
548-49 (5th.Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Durrett v. Wash-
ington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
Transfer of possession of the debtor's property during foreclosure proceedings is ef-
fected by the execution and delivery of the property deed to the purchaser at the foreclo-
sure sale. See Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203-04.
22. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Huhm, 738 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.), cert
denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer &
Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr.
910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richard-
son), 23 Bankr. 434, 445 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982).
The debtor's equity interest is traditionally known as his equity of redemption. See
Simpson, Real Property Foreclosurer The Fallacy of Durrett, 19 Real Prop. Prob. J. 73,
78 (1984). The common law equity of redemption right exists from the time of the
debtor's default to the foreclosure sale and allows the debtor to cure the default. See G.
Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 7.1, at 425; Washburn, supra note 10,
at 929. The majority of states statutorily recognize a redemption right of the debtor for a
specified period after a foreclosure sale. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra
note 9, § 7.1, at 425-26, § 8.4, at 536-37; Washburn, supra note 10, at 930, Answer to the
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It had been asserted that the application of the section 101 definition of
transfer is limited under section 548(a)(2), which contemplates only vol-
untary transfers by the debtor.2 3 Accordingly, because a foreclosure sale
involves an involuntary transfer, it would not be subject to avoidance
under section 548(a)(2). z4 This view, however, is no longer plausible in
light of the 1984 amendment to section 548(a)(2):
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property, or any obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or
incurred on or within one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily- ...
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer or obligation; and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such trans-
Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 202 & n.43. Instead of curing the default, the debtor
can protect his equity interest in the property by paying the sale price plus costs. See G.
Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra, note 9, § 7.1, at 425, § 7.3, at 428; Washburn,
supra note 10, at 930; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 202, 205 & n.64. A
transfer of the debtor's equity interest will occur upon the lapse of a state's redemption
period.
23. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.) (Farris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust
Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision),
cert denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 871
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 996-98. But see
First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir.) ("Section 101(41)
expressly includes involuntary transfers, and neither section 101(41) nor section 548(a)
indicates that to fall within their terms the transfer had to be made by [the debtor] him-
self."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Lakeview Inv. Group v. Pemberton, 40 Bankr.
449, 451 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (section 548(a) refers to a transfer of a debtor's interest
in property and not to a transfer by the debtor); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Ur-
stadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (interpretation of
section 548(a) to require a voluntary transfer by a debtor is an "erroneous construction of
slightly inartful statutory language"); Frank v. Berlin, 39 Bankr. 166, 169 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1984) (forced sales "are to be construed as having been made by the debtor");
Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (definition of transfer is
"sufficiently broad to include the disposition of the debtor's equity in property at a nonju-
dicial foreclosure sale"); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427-28
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting) ("Code definition of 'transfer' includes
involuntary transfer[s]" and thus includes foreclosure sales.), affd on other grounds, 725
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Answer to the Durrett Problem,
supra note 3, at 222 (definition of transfer includes "a transfer effected by a mortgage
foreclosure sale").
Section 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, the predecessor of § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code, contemplated transfers made by a debtor, whereas § 548(a)(2) contemplates
"transfer[s] of an interest of the debtor." Compare Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575,
§ 67d(2), 52 Stat. 840, 877 with Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)
(amended 1984). Both voluntary and involuntary transfers therefore would seem to have
been included under § 548(a)(2).
24. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1203 (9th Cir.) (Farris, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust
Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 871
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 996-98.
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fer or obligation .... 25
Although one senator has indicated that the amendment was not in-
tended to take a position on whether noncollusive foreclosure sales are
subject to avoidance under section 548(a)(2),26 courts must literally inter-
pret the amended section. A transfer for purposes of section 548(a)(2),
therefore, may be effected either voluntarily or involuntarily, and thus
includes noncollusive foreclosure sales. The 1984 amendments, however,
do not resolve the question whether a transfer occurs during foreclosure
proceedings.27 A controversy remains over the interpretation of section
548(d)(1), 28 a provision designed to determine the time at which a section
101 transfer occurs for purposes of section 548(a).2 9
B. Legislative Intent
Despite the inclusion of foreclosure sales within the ambit of section
548(a)(2) under a literal interpretation, it has been contended that the
intent of Congress is to the contrary. 0 The legislative history of section
548(a)(2), however, is silent on the question whether Congress intended
foreclosure sales to be avoidable transfers." This history dates back to
an English fraudulent conveyance statute, 2 the Statute of 13 Elizabeth,33
25. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)) (1984 amend-
ment indicated in italics).
26. See 130 Cong. Rec. S13,771-72 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
See supra note 19.
27. See id. (The amendment to § 548(a) is "consistent with the majority holding in
Madrid."). Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 125 (1984), created a split in the circuits by holding that a transfer does not
occur during foreclosure proceedings. Id at 1199.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
29. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
30. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 105 S. CL 125 (1984); William v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Bankr. 989, 991 (D.
Minn. 1984); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 986-95; Inapplicability of Section
548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 264-71.
31. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(Volinn, J., dissenting), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 125 (1984); Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 221-22; see Note,
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under Deed of Trust May be a Fraudulent Transfer of Bankrupt's
Property, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 345, 348-49 & n.33 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Nonjudicial
Foreclosure]. For a discussion of legislative history, see infra notes 32-47 and accompany-
ing text.
32. Weintraub & Resnick, Indirect Economic Benefit as Fair Consideration in Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Cases, 15 U.C.C. L.J. 75, 75 (1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note
14, at 988; Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495, 495
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Good Faith]; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note
17, at 264-65.
33. Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances, 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5, quoted in A. Elkus & G.
Glenn, A Treatise on Secret Liens and Reputed Ownership 179-80 (1910).
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which was designed to protect creditors from debtors who conveyed
property with an intent to defraud.34 A conveyance could be avoided
only if the debtor was found to possess the requisite intent.35 Congress
adopted the language of the Statute of 13 Elizabeth as a fraudulent con-
veyance provision in the early bankruptcy laws.36 In 1918 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uni-
form Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),37 also based on the Statute of
13 Elizabeth.38 In addition to an actual fraud provision,39 the UFCA
introduced a constructive fraud provision4° so that courts would not
have to invoke extra-statutory presumptions-"badges of fraud" 4 '-in
order to find fraudulent intent.42 The Chandler Act of 1938, 3 later re-
ferred to as the Bankruptcy Act of 1938," modeled its fraudulent con-
veyance provision largely on that found in the UFCA.45 The Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 adopted a similar constructive fraud provision 46-section
548(a)(2).47
Some commentators have asserted that section 548(a)(2) should be in-
trepreted in the same way as the UFCA provision,48 which arguably was
not intended to invalidate noncollusive foreclosure sales.49 Legislative
34. Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1605; Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra
note 14, at 988; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 265.
35. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1979); G. Glenn, The
Rights and Remedies of Creditors Respecting Their Debtor's Property 68, at 54 (1915);
Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 988.
36. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 989; see Bankruptcy Act of July 1,
1898, ch. 541, § 67e, 30 Stat. 544, 564-65, amended by Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575,
§ 67d, 52 Stat. 840, 877-78 (repealed 1978); Bankrupt Act of.March 2, 1867, ch. 176,
§ 35, 14 Stat. 517, 534 (repealed 1878); Bankrupt Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat.
440, 440-42 (repealed 1843); Bankrupt Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1, 2 Stat. 19, 19-21
(repealed 1803).
37. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA), 7A U.L.A. 161-366 (1918).
38. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 989-90; Good Faith, supra note 32, at
496-97 & n.8; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 265-66.
39. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 7, 7A U.L.A. 242 (1918). 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(1) is an actual fraud provision adopted by the Bankruptcy Code. See 4 Collier on
Bankruptcy 548.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
40. Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 4, 7A U.L.A. 205 (1918).
41. See G. Glenn, supra note 35, §§ 146-147, at 116-17; 1 D. Moore, A Treatise on
Fraudulent Conveyances and Creditors' Remedies at Law and in Equity 222-24 (1908);
Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 989.
42. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 990-91; Good Faith, supra note 32, at
497; see Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 266.
43. Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (superseded by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-15,1326 (1982)).
44. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 991.
45. Id.; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 267.
46. See Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 992; Inapplicability of Section
548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 269.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982).
48. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 992-95; Inapplicability of Section
548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 269-71.
49. Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 992-95; Inapplicability of Section
548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 265-70.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uni-
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intent, however, indicates that the two provisions are not necessarily to
be interpreted in the same manner. 50 Moreover, to do so would ignore
the fundamentally different goals of the UFCA and the Bankruptcy
Code. The purpose of a fraudulent conveyance law is only to make cer-
tain that some creditor reaches the debtor's assets,5 ' whereas the purpose
of the bankruptcy law is to allocate the debtor's assets among his credi-
tors.52 In addition, the definition of transfer in the Bankruptcy Code is
broader than the definition of conveyance in the UFCA. 3
The legislative history of section 548(a)(2) does not express an intent
to exclude foreclosure sales from its purview.54 That no case prior to
Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co.15 avoided a foreclosure
sale under section 548(a)(2),56 therefore, cannot be attributed to an ex-
clusionary intent on the part of the legislature. An examination of the
evolution of the statutory language of section 548(a)(2), however, may
provide an explanation. Although there was nothing in the language of
the constructive fraud provision adopted by the Chandler Act from the
UFCA to suggest that it should not be applied to foreclosure sales, that
provision did contain a good faith requirement for determining whether
fair consideration had been received.5" Fair consideration was received
in exchange for a transfer only if the parties acted in good faith. 8 A
court's consideration of the parties' good faith made unlikely a finding
form Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) on August 22, 1984. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer
Act (1984) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). The UFTA is a revised version of
the UFCA. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1984) (avail-
able in fies of Fordham Law Review). It creates a presumption of reasonably equivalent
value in regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sales. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer
Act § 3(b) (1984) (available in fies of Fordham Law Review).
50. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
51. Good Faith, supra note 32, at 502; see 2 G. Glenn, Mortgages, Deeds of Trust,
and Other Security Devices as to Land § 234, at 1111-12 (1943); 1 D. Moore, supra note
41, § 3, at 5-6, § 8, at 11-12, § 12, at 16.
52. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 60.01 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977); Good Faith,
supra note 32, at 502-03; see 2 D. Moore, supra note 41, at 1069.
53. 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.01 (L. King 15th ed. 1979); Cook, supra note 16, at
267; Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 983; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2),
supra note 17, at 267.
The definition of conveyance in the UFCA does not expressly include involuntary acts
by the debtor. See Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 1, 7A U.L.A. 164 (1918). The
definition of transfer in the UFTA, however, includes both voluntary and involuntary
dispositions. Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 1(12) (1984) (available in files of Fordham
Law Review).
54. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
55. 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Gill-
man v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 977; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2),
supra note 17, at 261-62; Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 346.
57. See Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 67d(1)(e), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (superseded by
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)).
58. See id
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that fair consideration had not been received in a regularly conducted
noncollusive foreclosure sale. The Bankruptcy Code, however, elimi-
nated the good faith requirement in its determination of reasonably
equivalent value59 and, therefore, the likelihood that a court would avoid
a foreclosure sale under section 548(a)(2) has increased.
C. Policy Considerations
It has been asserted that policy considerations dictate that foreclosure
sales should not be avoided under section 548(a)(2) as fraudulent trans-
fers.1 A major policy concern is that such avoidance may chill bidding
at foreclosure sales6 because of the possibility that the transfer may later
be avoided.62 In reality, however, the secured lender (mortgagee) is the
purchaser at ninety-nine percent of public foreclosure sales and is usually
the only bidder.63 When there are no third-party bidders, the mortgagee
59. Carr v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 656 n. I (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), ajfd, 40 Bankr.
1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr.
434, 447 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Cook, supra note 16, at 277; Inapplicability of Section
548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 276; see 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)).
Similarly, the UFTA does not prescribe good faith as a criterion for establishing rea-
sonably equivalent value, unlike the UFCA, which includes good faith in its definition of
fair consideration. Compare Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 3 (1984) (available in files of
Fordham Law Review) with Unif. Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 3, 7A U.L.A. 181
(1918).
60. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547,
550 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affld, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 982-83, 1013-
17; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 278-80. But see First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.) ("policy considerations cannot affect
the outcome in this case"), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); New Yorketown Assocs. v.
Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (policy
considerations "are insufficient justification for judicial evisceration of § 548"); Gillman
v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)
(policy arguments against the enforcement of an avoiding power are irrelevant).
61. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547,
550 (5th Cir. 1981) (Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), afi'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 1013; Inappli-
cability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 278; Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31,
at 351.
62. See Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1981)
(Clark, J., dissenting from per curiam decision), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Alsop
v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affid, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska
1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 1013.
63. Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 211.
In the majority of cases deciding this issue, the mortgagee was the purchaser at the
foreclosure sale. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.)
(mortgagee was the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398
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must bid in order to protect its interest in the property. 6  The price paid
for the property is usually no more than the value of the lien foreclosed
upon plus foreclosure sale costs."5 The mortgagee has no incentive to
(1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (secured lender was the purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Durrett v. Washington Natl Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202-03 (5th
Cir. 1980) (third party was the purchaser at a nonjudicial, public foreclosure sale); Wil-
liam v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39 Bankr. 989, 989 (D. Minn. 1984) (mortgagee was the pur-
chaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 869
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a judicial, public foreclosure
sale); In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 751-52 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984) (secured lender was
the purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale); Lakeview Inv. Group v. Pemberton, 40
Bankr. 449, 450 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a nonjudicial,
public foreclosure sale); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer,
Inc., 40 Bankr. 701,702 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a nonju-
dicial, public foreclosure sale); United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 667 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1984) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale); Carr v.
DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a
judicial, strict foreclosure sale), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Rosner v. Worces-
ter, 28 Bankr. 910, 912 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (third party was the purchaser at a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale); Federal Natl Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818,
820 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 437-38
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (third party was the purchaser at a nonjudicial, public foreclosure
sale); Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 23 Bankr. 36, 39
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (mortgagee was the purchaser at a foreclosure sale); Coleman v.
Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (mortgagee was the pur-
chaser at a foreclosure sale); Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345,
347 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (third party was the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale);
Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (secured lender was the
purchaser at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21
Bankr. 424, 425 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (third party was the purchaser at a nonjudicial,
public foreclosure sale), affid on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 125 (1984); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 989 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(mortgagee's attorney was the purchaser at a judicial foreclosure sale); Wickham v.
United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982) (third
party was the purchaser at a foreclosure sale); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 984
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (mortgagee was the sole bidder and purchaser at a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale), affid, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
64. Washburn, supra note 10, at 848-49; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3,
at 225; see Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
65. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547,
548 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Durrett v. Washing-
ton Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980); William v. Travelers Ins. Co., 39
Bankr. 989, 989 (D. Minn. 1984); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 869
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 752 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984);
New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 702
(E.D. Pa. 1984); Carr. v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 654 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), aft'd, 40
Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818,
820 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832,
833 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345,
347 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1982); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 425 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982),
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bid a higher price because it will receive title to the property regardless of
the amount bid and the purchase price will be used to satisfy its lien. 66
The mortgagee may then realize a windfall if it sells the property at fair
market value.67 The real chill, therefore, is not on bidding, which is vir-
tually nonexistent, but rather on the profit that the mortgagee would re-
alize as a result of this subsequent sale. Subjecting foreclosure sales to
avoidance under section 548(a)(2) allows unsecured creditors to share in
this profit and thus furthers the policy of the Bankruptcy Code favoring
equitable distribution of a debtor's assets among his creditors.6" In addi-
tion, it is conceivable that in a case in which the mortgagee pays less than
the value of the lien for the property, a deficiency judgment will be
sought against the debtor by the mortgagee to recover the remaining bal-
ance of the debt. 9 In this case, additional assets that should be distrib-
uted among the creditors may wind up in the lender's pocket.
A second concern is that creditors will be less willing to lend on the
security of a mortgage or deed of trust,7" and the cost of borrowing will
increase, 7 due to the risk imposed by subjecting noncollusive foreclosure
sales to avoidance under section 548(a)(2). This risk is that a foreclosure
sale occurring within one year before the debtor files a bankruptcy peti-
tion may later be avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy.72 The mortgagee,
however, will not necessarily lose its security interest: If the court finds
the mortgagee to be in good faith, it will grant the mortgagee a creditor's
lien on the property during the bankruptcy proceedings equal in value to
the outstanding debt.73 In addition, because section 548(a)(2) requires
afd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Home
Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Alsop v. Alaska, 14
Bankr. 982, 984 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affid, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
66. Washburn, supra note 10, at 849; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at
211-12.
67. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446
n.18 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Washburn, supra note 10, at 849, 889; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 212.
68. Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 447
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 348; Answer to the
Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 215-16. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
69. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446
n.18 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 8.1,
at 525; Washburn, supra note 10, at 849-50; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3,
at 207.
70. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981), afifd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at
1014; Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 278-79; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 224.
71. See Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 987 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22
Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 279-
80.
72. See Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 350-51.
73. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 449
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amend-
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(c), 1984 U.S. Code
[Vol. 53
NONCOLLUSIVE FORECLOSURE SALES
that the transfer cause the debtor's insolvency or that the debtor be insol-
vent on the transfer date,74 a petition for bankruptcy in these cases is filed
within a short time after the foreclosure sale, usually within a matter of
days.7" Mortgagees have always lent subject to the possibility that the
debtor would ifie a bankruptcy petition before the foreclosure sale.76 In
this case the Code imposes an automatic stay7 7 that postpones the sale
Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §548(c)); Nonjudicial
Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 351; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 224;
see also Carr v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 657 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (granting a credi-
tor's lien equal in value to outstanding debt), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984);
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 995 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (same).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)).
75. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir.) (petition
was filed 4 mos., 3 wks. and 2 days after the sale), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984);
Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (petition was filed 6 mos., 3 wks. and 1 day after the sale), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980)
(petition was fied 9 days after the sale); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 869
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (petition was filed 7 mos., 3 wks. and 2 days after the sale); In
re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 752 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984) (petition was filed approximately
45 minutes after the sale); Lakeview Inv. Group v. Pemberton, 40 Bankr. 449, 450
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (petition was filed 1 mo., 3 wks. and 5 days after the sale); Car
v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653, 654, 656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (petition was filed 42 days
after the sale), ajfd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr.
910, 912-13 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (petition was filed 35 days after the sale); Federal
Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983) (petition
was fied 23 days after the sale); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson),
23 Bankr. 434, 438 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (petition was filed 1 day after the sale); Cole-
man v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982) (petition was filed 2
mos., 4 wks. and 1 day after the sale); Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21
Bankr. 345, 346-47 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (petition was filed 1 mo., 3 wks. and 6 days
after the sale); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 21-22 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (petition
was fied 14 days after the sale); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 425
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (petition was filed 7 days after the sale), aff'd, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 989
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (petition was filed 4 mos., 2 wks. and 1 day after the sale); Wick-
ham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982)
(petition was filed 1 mo., 4 wks. and I day after the sale); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982,
984 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (petition was filed 2 days after the sale), aff'd, 22 Bankr.
1017 (D. Alaska 1982); Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1619.
76. See In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 F. 625, 627 (9th Cir. 1905); Alden, Gross
& Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1619; Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 347; An-
swer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 224.
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362(a), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) 333, 371 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)); Bankr. R. P. 601; G.
Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 8.12, at 556; Alden, Gross &
Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1619; Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 347; Answer
to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 224; see also Meyer v. Rowen, 181 F.2d 715, 716
(10th Cir. 1950) (inposing an automatic stay); In re McCann, 27 Bankr. 678, 679 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) (same); Yancy v. Adree Acceptance Co., 23 Bankr. 945, 948-51 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1982) (same); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 990-91 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1982) (same); Joe DeLisi Fruit Co. v. Minnesota, I 1 Bankr. 694, 695-96 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1981) (same).
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until the bankruptcy proceedings are completed or the stay is vacated.78
Subjecting noncollusive foreclosure sales to avoidance under section
548(a)(2) merely extends this risk a few more days.
A third concern is that if the sale is avoided under section 548(a)(2), a
mortgagee who is the purchaser at a foreclosure sale may be exposed to
liability as a result of reselling the property.79 Under section 550(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, 0 such a mortgagee who resells the property before
the bankruptcy petition is filed will be required to pay the difference be-
tween the fair market value of the property on the foreclosure sale date,
as determined by the bankruptcy court, and the price it paid for the
property at the foreclosure sale.81 A mortgagee who resells the property
prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition will be penalized if the bank-
ruptcy court values the property in excess of the resale price.8" However,
because the bankruptcy petition is usually filed a short time after the
foreclosure sale,83 the mortgagee is timely alerted that the sale may be
avoided by the trustee in bankruptcy. Any subsequent sale of the prop-
erty will thus be made with such notice.
A court should not justify its decision to exclude foreclosure sales from
the purview of section 548(a)(2) on policy grounds alone,8 4 which in any
event do not weigh as heavily in favor of exclusion as some commenta-
tors have suggested.85 Because the legislative history is silent, 6 the lan-
guage of section 548(a)(2) and the overall purpose of the Bankruptcy
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)-(g) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362(c)-(g), 1984 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 371 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)-(g)); Bankr. R. P.
601; G. Osborne, G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 8.11, at 555; Answer to the
Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 215; see also Yancy v. Adree Acceptance Co., 23
Bankr. 945, 948 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982) (staying foreclosure sale).
79. See Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 982-83; Nonjudicial Foreclosure,
supra note 31, at 351; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 225.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 550(a), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
(98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550(a)).
81. See id.; Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 982; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 226.
82. If the mortgagee is in good faith, it will receive a lien on the property in the
amount of improvements made after the transfer less any profit realized as a result of the
subsequent sale or the increase in value of the property attributable to such improve-
ments. 11 U.S.C. § 550(d) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 550(d), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
(98 Stat.) 333, 379-80 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)); see Zinman, Houle & Weiss,
supra note 14, at 1014.
83. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
84. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc.,
40 Bankr. 701, 706 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re
Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); see 2A N. Singer, Sutherland's
Statutes and Statutory Construction § 56.01, at 627 (C. Sands rev. 4th ed. 1984).
85. See supra notes 61-83 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 31-54 and accompanying text.
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Code,87 warranting the inclusion of foreclosure sales within the scope of
section 548(a)(2), must be examined.88
II. TIME OF THE TRANSFER
Although it is established that a transfer occurs during foreclosure
proceedings,89 the time at which this transfer occurs for purposes of sec-
tion 548(a)(2) remains to be determined. This is necessary because only
transfers occurring within one year prior to the filing of a bankruptcy
petition may be subject to avoidance under section 548(a)(2).9° This de-
termination of time depends on the interpretation of section 548(d)(1). 9 ,
Section 548(d)(1)92 was not substantively affected by the 1984 amend-
ments. The amended version reads as follows:
For the purposes of this section, a transfer is made when such transfer
is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against
whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot ac-
quire an interest in the property transferred that is superior to the in-
terest in such property of the transferee, but if such transfer is not so
perfected before the commencement of the case, such transfer is made
immediately before the date of the filing of the petition. 93
Because of the policy concerns discussed above,94 some courts have
struggled to find that a foreclosure sale cannot be avoided under section
548(a)(2).95 To rationalize this finding they have held that the transfer
occurs on the date of the perfection of the mortgagee's security interest,96
87. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
88. See N. Singer, supra note 84, § 46.01, at 73-74 (if the language of a statute is
plain, the courts must enforce the statute according to its terms), § 46.05, at 90-91 (each
section of a statute should be construed in accordance with the statute's general purpose),
§ 48.01, at 278 (when the legislative history of a statute is ambiguous, a court must use
"intrinsic" aids to interpret it), § 56.02, at 629 (a statute should be interpreted in accord-
ance with its purpose).
89. See supra notes 16-88 and accompanying text.
90. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)).
91. See First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. CL 398 (1984); Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200-
01 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986
(Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982); 4 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy t 548.02 (L. King 15th ed. 1979); Cook, supra note 16, at 269 & n.28.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 60-83 and accompanying text.
95. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1199-1203 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986-88 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981), afl'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
96. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986-88 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981), a]j'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
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which in most cases is not within one year prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition.97 These courts have reached this conclusion through
their interpretation of section 548(d)(l): 98 Under state law a bona fide
purchaser of the property, purchasing after the perfection date of the
security interest and before the foreclosure sale, could not acquire an
interest in the property superior to that of the purchaser at the foreclo-
sure sale.99
If the language of section 548(d)(1) is interpreted in light of its purpose
and the policy of the Bankruptcy Code, however, it is evident that the
transfer occurs in the course of the foreclosure proceedings and does not
relate back to the date of the perfection of the mortgagee's security inter-
est. The intent of Congress in enacting section 548(d)(1) was to give the
trustee in bankruptcy the power to avoid secret transfers of the debtor's
interest.l °° Because secret transfers were unperfected, 01 a bona fide pur-
97. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Huhm, 738 F.2d 323,'326 (8th Cir.) (mortga-
gee's security interest was perfected more than one year prior to the filing of the bank-
ruptcy petition), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Abramson v. Lakewood Bank &
Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1164 (1982); Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 202 n. 1, 204 (5th Cir.
1980) (same); Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 871 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(same); Lakeview Inv. Group v. Pemberton, 40 Bankr. 449, 450 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984)
(same); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 911, 913 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (same);
Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 437-38 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (same); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1982) (same); Smith v. American Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 346-47 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1982) (same); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 20-21 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982)
(same); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 425-26 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)
(same), afl'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 989 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (same);
Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 68 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982) (same); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 984, 986 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) (same),
affid, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
98. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200-03 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986-88 (Bankr. D. Alaska
1981), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
99. See Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1199 & n.1 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Alsop v. Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 986 (Bankr. D.
Alaska 1981), affd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
100. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 548.01[2] (L. King 15th ed. 1979); 3
Collier on Bankruptcy t% 60.37[l]-[4], 60.38 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977). In the
absence of § 548(d)(1), a transfer could be immune from avoidance if it were kept secret
until after the one-year limitation period had lapsed. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy I
548.08 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code enables the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid certain
transfers of a debtor's property occurring prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
which afford preferential treatment to one creditor over others. See 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 1 60.021] (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977) (discussing § 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act, which was redesignated § 547 by the Bankruptcy Code). Sections 547(e) and
548(d)(1) both fix the time at which a transfer occurs based on the time at which such
transfer was perfected. Compare I 1 U.S.C. § 547(e) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 547(e), 1984
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(e))
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chaser of property that was the subject of a prior secret transfer could
acquire an interest in the property superior to that of the transferee.102
In this case, section 548(d)(1) would serve to move the date of the secret
transfer to the time immediately before the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion.103 Accordingly, the one year limitation in section 548(a) could not
bar avoidance of a secret transfer." 4 Although the language of section
548(d)(1) suggests that it applies not only to secret transfers but to all
transfers scrutinized under section 548,05 it is a provision designed to
subject an unperfected transfer to avoidance by moving the transfer date
further ahead in time 06 and not to prevent avoidance by moving the
transfer date back in time. In addition, the use of section 548(d)(1) as a
vehicle to prevent avoidance of a transfer contravenes the Bankruptcy
Code's policy to distribute a debtor's assets equitably among his
creditors. 107
The "relation-back" analysis used to prevent avoidance of foreclosure
sales is also inconsistent with the language of section 548(d)(1). The
analysis is implicitly premised on either of two misconceptions. First, a
court invoking this analysis may disregard the fact that section 101(48)
transfers of the debtor's possessory and equity interests in the property
occur during foreclosure proceedings. 18 Instead, it scrutinizes under
section 548(d)(1) the section 101(48) transfer of the security interest in
the property to the mortgagee via the mortgage instrument. 09 Applying
section 548(d)(1) in light of this misconception,"10 the transfer of the se-
with 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)). The legislative intent
behind both of these sections is the same. Compare 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 4ill 60.371l]-
[4], 60.38 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977) (discussing the intent of § 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act) with 4 Collier on Bankruptcy I 548.01[2] (L. King 15th ed. 1979) (discussing
the intent of § 548(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code).
101. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 548.08 (L. King 15th ed. 1979); 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 11 60.36-.38 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
102. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 548.08 (L. King 15th ed. 1979); 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 1 60.36 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
103. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy q 548.08 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
104. Madrid v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 67.40 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed.
1978).
105. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy I 60.38 CL. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977).
106. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy $ 548.08 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
107. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
108. It appears that this misconception was employed by the Madrid court. In a foot-
note the court stated: "As we hold that a transfer under § 548(a) does not occur at time
of foreclosure, we do not base our holding ua the relation back doctrine." Madrid v.
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 725 F.2d 1197, 1199 n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984).
109. Id. at 1200 ("[A] transfer occurred when [the mortgagee's] security interest in
[the property] was perfected under [state] law.").
110. Some authorities rejecting the "relation-back" analysis believe that it is premised
on this misconception. See First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Hulm, 738 F.2d 323, 327 (8th
Cir.) ("Section 548(d)(1) is in no way inconsistent with our conclusion that separate and
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curity interest "is so perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected [could
not] acquire an interest in the property transferred that is superior to the
interest in such property of the [mortgagee]"' 11 on the date of the perfec-
tion of the mortgagee's security interest. The time at which the transfer
occurs under this view, therefore, is the date on which the security inter-
est is perfected. This analysis is erroneous because it is the section
101(48) transfer occurring during the foreclosure proceedings that
should be scrutinized under section 548(d)(1)." 2 As previously estab-
lished, both the debtor's possessory and equity interests are transferred at
some time during state foreclosure proceedings. 3 It is these transfers,
not the transfer of the security interest in the property to the mortgagee,
that the trustee in bankruptcy seeks to avoid under section 548(a)(2)., " 4
Operating under a second misconception, a court invoking the rela-
tion-back analysis correctly scrutinizes the section 101(48) transfer of
either the debtor's possessory or equity interest under section
548(d)(1), 115 but applies section 548(d)(1) incorrectly. Instead of looking
forward from the time of the section 101(48) transfer to determine
whether a bona fide purchaser could acquire a superior interest, the court
looks back in time.' 6 Applying section 548(d)(1) in this way," 7 before
the date of the transfer of the debtor's possessory or equity interest dur-
distinct interests in property may be transferred at different times. It is our view that
foreclosure of [a] mortgage. . . effect[s] a transfer of the interest retained by [the debtor]
after he granted a mortgage."), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984); Gillman v. Preston
Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 445 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) ("Alsop's
interpretation of section 548(d)(1). . . . improperly fuses two separate transfers: the
transfer to the lender of a lien by means of a deed of trust and the subsequent transfer of
the debtor's equity to a purchaser by means of a foreclosure sale."); Alden, Gross &
Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1609 ("[Alsop's] conclusion that the foreclosure should be
deemed to relate back to the time of the granting of the underlying security interest,
which itself undeniably constitutes a transfer, makes the 'transfer' of foreclosure a
nonevent."). The conclusion in Alsop, however, appears to be premised on a second mis-
conception. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
111. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fcd-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
112. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 446
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
113. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
114. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 445-
46 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
115. It appears that the Alsop court operated under this misconception. See Alsop v.
Alaska, 14 Bankr. 982, 985-86 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981) ("[I]n Alaska a foreclosure sale
passes both title and possession to the purchaser . . . .Although the transaction that
occurred at the foreclosure sale might, standing alone, satisfy the definition of transfer of
§101(40), that definition does not stand alone in § 548. Section 548(d)(1) sets out special
rules to determine when a transfer is made for purposes of § 548.") (citations omitted),
affid, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
116. Id. at 986 ("[T]he interest of the purchaser at a foreclosure sale is perfected at tile
time of the recording of the original deed of trust. . . .Since under Alaska law no pur-
chaser from Plaintiffs subsequent to Plaintiffs' execution of the deed of trust and its recor-
dation . . . could have acquired an interest superior to that of the transferee at the
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ing the foreclosure proceedings, "a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected [could
not] acquire an interest in the property transferred that is superior to the
interest in such property of the [purchaser at the foreclosure sale]" '
after the date of the perfection of the mortgagee's security interest. Ac-
cordingly, the date of the perfection of the security interest would be the
transfer date under this analysis.
Such an interpretation is erroneous because it is the period after, not
before, the section 101(48) transfer to which a court should look in deter-
mining the time at which a bona fide purchaser could acquire an interest
superior to that of the transferee.' 19 This is evident when the interpreta-
tion is applied in cases involving transfers other than foreclosure sales.
Although in the case of a transfer occurring during foreclosure proceed-
ings a bona fide purchaser before the transfer date could not acquire an
interest superior to the transferee's between the date of perfection of the
security interest and the section 101(48) transfer date,120 in cases involv-
ing virtually all other section 101(48) transfers a bona fide purchaser
prior to the transfer date could have acquired an interest in the property
superior to that of the transferee. The time of the transfer under section
548(d)(1) in cases other than foreclosure sales would be "immediately
before the date of the filing of the [bankruptcy] petition" '' if the court
were to look to the time before the section 101(48) transfer. The bulk of
section 548(d)(1) would thus be rendered meaningless in cases involving
transfers other than foreclosure sales. In addition, transfers made prior
to one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition would be deemed
under this analysis to have been made immediately before the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Section 548(d)(1) would serve to subject almost all
transfers to avoidance under section 548(a)(2) regardless of when the
transfer occurred in relation to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
application of section 548(d)(1), therefore, contemplates bona fide pur-
foreclosure sale, pursuant to the provisions of § 548(d)(1) the transfer was made [on the
date of perfection].").
117. Some commentators supporting the "relation-back" analysis uphold it on the ba-
sis of this misapplication. See Simpson, supra note 22, at 78-79; Zinman, Houle & Weiss,
supra note 14, at 999-1000. Others rejecting the "relation-back" analysis use this misap-
plication to support a conclusion that a transfer during foreclosure proceedings does not
relate back to the date of perfection under § 548(d)(1) when the value of the mortgaged
property exceeds the secured debt. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1610-
11.
118. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
119. See 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 60.36, 60.39, 60.41 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed.
1977); Cook, supra note 16, at 269.
120. See Simpson, supra note 22, at 79; Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 14, at 999-
1000.
121. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
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chasers existing after the section 101(48) transfer date and can serve only
to move the section 101(48) transfer date further ahead in time for pur-
poses of section 548(a)(2).
In a correct application of section 548(d)(1), a court should look to
state law to determine whether the transfer is so perfected that a bona
fide purchaser from the debtor who purchases the property after the
debtor's equity or possessory interest has been transferred during the
foreclosure proceedings can acquire an interest superior to that of the
foreclosure sale purchaser.'22 If under state law a bona fide purchaser
cannot acquire a superior interest, the section 548(d)(1) transfer date is
the date during the course of the foreclosure proceedings after which
such a superior interest cannot be acquired. If under state law a bona
fide purchaser can acquire an interest superior to that of the transferee,
the transfer date will be "immediately before the date of the filing of the
[bankruptcy] petition."'' 23
III. "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE" AT A FORECLOSURE SALE
Once it has been determined that a transfer has occurred within one
year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and that the debtor is
insolvent on the transfer date or has been rendered insolvent by the
transfer, the transfer can be avoided under section 548(a)(2) only if a
reasonably equivalent value has not been received by the debtor. Courts
have taken three different approaches to the question of reasonably
equivalent value at a foreclosure sale. The first approach purportedly
follows Durrett v. Washington National Insurance Co. 24 and asserts that
reasonably equivalent value is not received at a foreclosure sale when the
purchase price is less than 70% of the fair market value on the sale
date. 25 In Durrett, the court held that reasonably equivalent value had
not been received for property that was sold for 57.7% of its fair market
value.' 26 It based its holding on the fact that it was unable to find any
authority approving a transfer, challenged under section 67(d) of the
Bankruptcy Act, in which less than 70% of the property's fair market
value on the sale date was received. 2 7 Many courts deciding this issue
122. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 11 547.48, 548.08 (15th ed. 1979); 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy 60.39[2], 60.40 (L. King & J. Moore 14th ed. 1977). For a description of state
law concerning perfection of real property transfers, see 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 547.48
(L. King 15th ed. 1979).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982), as amended by Bankruptcy Amendments and Fed-
eral Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(d)(1), 1984 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 379 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1)).
124. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
125. See Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D.
Ala. 1983); Coleman v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982);
Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982).
126. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
127. Id.
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have read Durrett as establishing a 70% test.'28 This interpretation is
erroneous. Because in Durrett only 57.7% of the fair market value of the
property had been received at the foreclosure sale,129 Durrett's discussion
of the 70% figure is dictum.13 0 Durrett thus at best establishes a Fifth
Circuit precedent that a price of 57.7% of the fair market value or less is
not reasonably equivalent value in cases in which the facts and circum-
stances are similar to those in Durrett.'13
A second approach is to presume conclusively that reasonably
equivalent value has been received at a foreclosure sale."3 2 The justifica-
tion for this view is that under state law a foreclosure sale could not be
set aside due to an inadequacy of price alone. 33 For purposes of section
548(a)(2), however, reasonably equivalent value should not be deter-
mined by state law 3 4 but rather should be a function of the policy under-
lying the Bankruptcy Code:3 5 to distribute a debtor's assets equally
among similarly situated creditors." 6 Prices received at foreclosure sales
are usually significantly below the fair market value of the property be-
128. See Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984);
United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 669-70 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); Federal
Nat'1 Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); Coleman
v. Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982); Lawyers Title Ins.
Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds,
725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. CL 125 (1984); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones,
20 Bankr. 988, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thomp-
son), 18 Bankr. 67, 70 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
129. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting), affid on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
131. See Gilman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr.
9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting), affd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 105 S. CL 125 (1984).
132. See Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984);
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426-27 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), affid
on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Madrid, 21
Bankr. at 428 (Volinn, J. dissenting); Inapplicability of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17,
at 275. The UFTA has adopted this approach. See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 3(b)
(1984) (available in files of Fordham Law Review). But see Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v.
Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 428 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting) (adequacy of
consideration must be examined), affid on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984).
133. See Strauser v. Veterans Admin., 40 Bankr. 868, 870 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984);
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on
other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Washburn,
supra note 10, at 859; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 214; Inapplicability
of Section 548(a)(2), supra note 17, at 275-76.
134. "[T]here is nothing novel in avoiding transfers under bankruptcy law which are
valid under state law." Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr.
434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
135. See iL at 447; 2A N. Singer, supra note 84, § 46.05, at 56, § 56.02, at 403.
136. See Nonjudicial Foreclosure, supra note 31, at 348; Answer to the Durrett Problem,
supra note 3, at 214.
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cause the sales are forced, as opposed to arms' length transactions be-
tween willing buyers and sellers. 137 Consequently, the debtor loses his
equity in the property in almost all cases.13 He will thus have neither
the ability nor the incentive to exercise his equity of redemption right, I 9
which ordinarily would serve to preserve his equity interest. 40 Because
the debtor is bankrupt, he will probably not have the necessary funds to
cure the default himself, and he will not have the incentive to sell the
property at fair market value in order to redeem an equity interest that
will be lost to him in any event. 141 The debtor's equity in the property,
therefore, is not distributed among creditors, but instead is realized by
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale. 142 That purchaser in most cases is
the mortgagee. 143  Due to this inequity, the receipt of reasonably
equivalent value should not be presumed in a foreclosure sale.
A third approach is to examine the facts and circumstances in each
case to determine whether reasonably equivalent value has been received
at a foreclosure sale." This analysis is the most appropriate1 45 because
even in establishing a fixed percentage test a court may base its decision
in part on equitable circumstances. 146 Also, conflicting or insufficient ev-
idence may make it difficult for a court to ascertain the fair market value
of the property.47 Therefore, reasonably equivalent value should not be
a function of fair market value alone. Among the factors that courts
137. Washburn, supra note 10, at 848.
138. Id. at 850; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 211-12.
139. See Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 223.
140. For a discussion of the debtor's equity interest, see supra note 22.
141. See Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 223.
142. See Washburn, supra note 10, at 850; Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note
3, at 223.
143. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
144. See DeMusis v. Carr, 40 Bankr. 1007, 1009 (D. Conn. 1984) (expressly adopting a
case-by-case approach); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23
Bankr. 434, 448 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (same); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23
(Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982) (same); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 428
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (Volinn, J., dissenting) (advocating a case-by-case approach), afj'd
on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); Home Life
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 994 n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (expressly adopting a
case-by-case approach); see also In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1984) (implicitly adopting a case-by-case approach); New Yorketown Assocs. v. Pierce,
Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984) (same);
United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 670 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984) (same); Frank
v. Berlin, 39 Bankr. 166, 176-77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Rosner v. Worcester, 28
Bankr. 910, 915 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983) (same); Smith v. American Consumer Fin.
Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 351 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (same).
145. See 4 Collier on Bankruptcy 548.09 (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
146. See Answer to the Durrett Problem, supra note 3, at 210.
147. Id. at 210-11; see United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 669-70 (Bankr.
M.D. Pa. 1984); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Gill-
man v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 441-44 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 993 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982);
Wickham v. United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67, 69 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1982).
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have considered under the case-by-case approach are the good faith of
the purchaser, 48 the relative difference in the amount paid as compared
to the fair market value of the property, 49 the percentage of the fair
market value represented by the amount paid,' 5 the bargaining position
148. See Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982).
Arguably, good faith should not be considered in a case-by-case approach because the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 omitted it as a factor in determining reasonably equivalent
value. By contrast, the Bankruptcy Act had expressly included good faith in its definition
of fair consideration. Compare Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2549, 2600 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)), as amended by Bank.
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 548(a)(2),
1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (98 Stat.) 333, 378-79 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2)) with Bankruptcy Act, ch. 575, § 67d(l), 52 Stat. 840, 877 (1938) (superseded
by 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1982)). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
149. See Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982).
150. See In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1984); New Yorketown
Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984); United Penn Bank v. Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666, 670 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); Frank
v. Berlin, 39 Bankr. 166, 177 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); Carr v. DeMusis, 34 Bankr. 653,
656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Rosner v. Vorces-
ter, 28 Bankr. 910, 914-15 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co.
(In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 441 & n.II (Bankr. D. Utah 1982); Smith v. American
Consumer Fin. Corp., 21 Bankr. 345, 351-52 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); Cooper v. Smith,
24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988,
993-94 & n.23 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
Because the purchaser at a foreclosure sale will assume liability for any encumbrances
remaining on the property after the sale, a court should subtract the value of post-sale
liens on the property from the fair market value before comparing the fair market value
to the sale price. Some courts have performed this computation. See Carr v. DeMusis, 34
Bankr. 653, 656 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983), aff'd, 40 Bankr. 1007 (D. Conn. 1984); Gillman
v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 441-42 & n.l 1 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982). Other courts compare the full fair market value of the property to the sale
price. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980); Fed-
eral Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818, 821 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983);
Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Equitable Trust Co., 23 Bankr. 36, 39-40
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Cooper v. Smith, 24 Bankr. 19, 23 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982);
Home Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 20 Bankr. 988, 993-94 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wickham v.
United Am. Bank (In re Thompson), 18 Bankr. 67,70 (Bankr. ED. Tenn. 1982). A third
approach is to compare the sale price to the fair market value less all liens including the
one being foreclosed upon. See In re Marble, 40 Bankr. 751, 752-53 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1984); Rosner v. Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910, 914 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Coleman v.
Home Say. Ass'n, 21 Bankr. 832, 834 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1982). A fourth approach is to
compare the sale price plus the value of the lien being foreclosed upon with the fair
market value on the sale date. This calculation is used only when the mortgagee is the
purchaser because the value of the lien added to the sale price represents value given by
the mortgagee in the form of satisfaction of an antecedent debt. See New Yorketown
Assocs. v. Pierce, Urstadt, Mayer & Greer, Inc., 40 Bankr. 701, 706-07 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984); Madrid v. Del Mar Commerce Co., 10 Bankr. 795, 797-98, 800 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1981), rev'd sub nom. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125
(1984). Only two courts have expressly recognized these various calculations. See Frank
v. Berlin, 39 Bankr. 166, 176-77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984) (employing all methods); Gill-
man v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 441 n.l 1 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982) (adopting only the calculation that compares the sale price to the fair market
value less post-sale liens).
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of the parties, 5 ' and the marketability of the property transferred. 52
In addition to these, courts should also consider several factors that
stem from policy considerations underlying the Bankruptcy Code.' 53
One factor is whether the foreclosure sale was judicial or nonjudicial. 54
A nonjudicial sale should be viewed with stricter scrutiny because there
is a greater probability that reasonably equivalent value has not been re-
ceived if the court does not supervise the sale.1 55 A second factor is
whether the foreclosure sale would have produced a surplus above the
amount needed to satisfy the mortgagee's lien on the property, plus costs
and expenses of the action, had the property been sold at fair market
value. If the value of the property is greater than the mortgagee's lien
and the purchase price is less than the fair market value, the purchaser
has received the residual value of the debtor's equity of redemption, 56
which should be distributed among the creditors according to the policy
of the Bankruptcy Code.'57 A third factor is whether the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale is a third party or the mortgagee.1 58 Courts should
scrutinize the sale more strictly when the mortgagee is the purchaser' 59
because the mortgagee may be forced to bid to protect its interest and has
no incentive to bid a fair price.'" A purchase by a third party is evi-
dence of a regularly conducted sale and a fair purchase price.1 6' Another
factor is whether there was competitive bidding at the foreclosure sale.' 62
The existence of competitive bidding would tend to indicate that reason-
ably equivalent value has been received.' 63 Finally, courts should deter-
mine whether the purchaser at the foreclosure sale has resold the
property at a profit. 64 To determine whether a profitable resale indicates
151. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 448
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982); cf Cook, supra note 16, at 278 (stating factors a court should
consider in determining fair consideration under § 3 of the UFCA).
152. See supra note 151.
153. See Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson), 23 Bankr. 434, 447
(Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
154. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1621-23; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 228-34. For a comparison ofjudicial and nonjudicial foreclosure
sales, see supra note 11.
155. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1621-23; Answer to the Durrett
Problem, supra note 3, at 228-34.
156. See G. Osborne, G. Nelson-& D. Whitman, supra note 9, § 8.12, at 558.
157. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
158. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1617-20; cf Washburn, supra
note 10, at 888-89 (whether mortgagee is the purchaser is a factor state courts consider in
determining whether to vacate a foreclosure sale).
159. See Alden, Gross & Borowitz, supra note 17, at 1617-20; cf. Washburn, supra
note 10, at 888-89 (purchase by a stranger indicates a fair purchase price).
160. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
161. See Washburn, supra note 10, at 888.
162. Cf id. at 888-89 (competitive bidding is a factor state courts consider in determin-
ing whether to vacate a foreclosure sale).
163. Cf id. (competitive bidding indicates that a foreclosure proceeding has been con-
ducted fairly).
164. Cf id. at 889-90 (whether mortgagee sells at a profit is a factor state courts con-
sider in determining whether to vacate a foreclosure sale).
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that less than reasonably equivalent value has been received at the fore-
closure sale, a court should view the length of the purchaser's holding
period before resale, physical improvements and other investments made
prior to resale, and increases in the market value of the property.1 65
CONCLUSION
Noncollusive foreclosure sales are subject to avoidance as fraudulent
transfers under section 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. A transfer of
the debtor's possessory and equity interests occurs at some time during
state foreclosure proceedings. If the transfer has occurred within one
year prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition and the debtor is insol-
vent on the transfer date or has been rendered insolvent by the transfer,
the transfer can be avoided if reasonably equivalent value has not been
received by the debtor. The most appropriate approach to measuring
reasonably equivalent value in foreclosure sales is a case-by-case analysis.
It is this approach that is most consistent with the language of section
548(a)(2) and the policy underlying the Code.
In addition, section 548(d)(1), which determines the time at which a
transfer occurs for purposes of section 548(a)(2), can serve only to move
the transfer date forward in time. Courts err when they interpret this
section as moving the transfer date back in time to the date on which the
mortgagee's security interest was perfected. The purpose of section
548(d)(1) is to subject unperfected transfers to avoidance and not to pre-
vent the avoidance of transfers which may or may not be perfected.
It is unlikely, however, that courts will reach a consensus on these
issues without a Supreme Court decision or additional bankruptcy
amendments. The Supreme Court probably will continue to deny peti-
tions of certiorari due to the many policy concerns involved, the fact that
the legislature did not have the opportunity to hold hearings on the mat-
ter before the 1984 bankruptcy amendments were passed, and the ambi-
guities in the legislative intent underlying the 1984 amendments.
The ultimate resolution rests with the legislature. Unfortunately, it is
doubtful, in light of the recent passage of the 1984 amendments, that
Congress will review the Bankruptcy Code in the near future, unless per-
suaded to do so by lobbyists. Should Congress decide that the policy
concerns are significant, it may abrogate the holding of Durrett or set
forth standards under which noncollusive foreclosure sales are to be scru-
tinized under section 548(a)(2). In the interim, courts should not base
their decisions on policy considerations, many of which have been exag-
gerated, but must interpret the language of section 548(a)(2) in light of
the goals of the Bankruptcy Code.
Darcy Lopez
165. Cf id at 890 (resale price alone does not measure the propriety of a foreclosure
sale).
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